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The only case decided by the Supreme Court during the review
period in the field of Agency was Johnson v. Life Insurance Company
of Georgia,1 but that case is of considerable academic interest in that
a minority of the Court sought, almost successfully, to limit sharply
the respondeat superior liability of employers in the field of slander.
The difference between the two groups of Justices lay in whether, in
the rule that for a corporation to be liable for slander uttered by its
agent, "it must appear that the latter was at the time acting within the
scope of his employment and in the actual performance of the duties
of the corporation touching the matter in question", the phrase "the
matter in question" having reference to the subject matter of what
is uttered or to the occasion of the uttering.
In the Johnson case, the plaintiff had made claim under policies
issued by the defendant insurance company for the accidental loss
of a leg. An industrial insurance agent of the company, in soliciting
business from friends of the plaintiff, was asked why the plaintiff's
claim had not been paid and replied that the plaintiff had shot off
his leg on purpose- that he "had stolen the insurance money from
the other companies, but he wasn't going to steal it from this company." The agent making these statements bad had nothing to do
with handling the plaintiff's claim. As a matter of fact, the claim
had been paid prior to this conversation. In the slander suit which
ensued, a substantial verdict was returned against both the insurance
company and the agent, but the Circuit Court granted the insurance
company's motion for a judgment n.o.v. on the ground that there was
no evidence from which the jury could reasonably have concluded
that the agent, in making the slanderous statements, was acting within
the scope of his employment.
In the opinion of Mr. Justice Legge, the Circuit Court was correct
in this holding because 'the agent, to create liability against his principal, must have been "in the actual performance of the duties of the
corporation touching the matter in question" and the "matter in question" here was the denial of the Johnson accident claim with which
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the agent admittedly had nothing to do. Mr. Justice Legge discusses virtually every South Carolina decision allowing recovery
against an employer for slander spoken by an employee in an effort
to show that in all of them the employee's remarks pertained to something which he had been authorized to handle for the employer - the
investigation of a theft or the settlement of an account with an exemployee. He points out how frequently the Court, in sustaining
verdicts or overruling demurrers, had emphasized that the employee
was expressing the position of the employer as to matters which the
employee was then charged with handling. He draws the conclusion
that unless an employee is handling a matter for his employer, his
statements in regard to it cannot be in the performance of his duties.
Chief Justice Baker concurred with the whole of Justice Legge's
opinion, but the view of Justices Stukes, Taylor and Oxner that the
judgment against the corporate defendant had been improperly set
aside prevailed. The majority of the Court held that the respondeat
superior rule in respect to slander is no different from that in other
torts, and that if the utterance itself is made in the furtherance of the
master's business, the master is responsible regardless of whether the
agent who speaks is speaking from his own experience with the master or whether he is correctly stating the master's position in the
matter. According to the majority, it was for the jury to say whether
the insurance company's agent was endeavoring to promote its business in explaining to a prospective customer why a certain claim had
not been paid.
It would seem that Mr. Justice Legge's view of the proper application of the respondeat superior rule in slander cases, although expressed persuasively and with great regard for the precedents, is without real support in the authorities. In addition to the general authorities from other jurisdictions cited by the majority, see Section 247
of the Restatement of the Law of Agency. It is true that in most
cases the employee who speaks the slander has been in charge of investigating the matter for his employer and the courts do frequently
advert to that fact in their discussions, but we can find no case in
which the liability is actually rested upon the scope of the agent's employment in investigating the facts rather than the scope of his employment in making the statement concerning the facts. It would
also seem that the rule advocated by Mr. Justice Legge could lead to
these illogical results: (1) a corporation could never be responsible
for slander if the only employees who spread it were those who knew
nothing of the facts they were discussing; (2) an employee who had
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investigated the facts in the scope of his employment might subject
his employer to liability by publishing them on an occasion not in the
scope of his employment; and (3) a corporation could not be responsible for slandering a competitor or any other person who had not had
a contractual relationship with the corporation which could be the
subject of an investigation by corporate agents.
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